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IS MARRIAGE FOR RICH MEN?1
June Carbone* & Naomi Cahn**
At the center of critical theory, including feminism and much of masculin-
ities theory, is a distrust of hierarchy. Yet, promotion of gender equality
between men and women does not necessarily address the role of hierarchies
among men or among women,2 and the role of male hierarchies often has dif-
ferent consequences from those among women.3 In this article, we use mascu-
linities theory, which focuses on the construction of manhood and masculinity,
to critique the relationship between marriage, male inequality, and gender
hierarchy.
Marriage has become a symbol in the culture wars whether the focus is on
the decreasing rates of marriage and high levels of divorce or on the increasing
access of gays and lesbians to the institution. Conservatives tend to see the
decline of marriage as a sign of individual moral failings.4 Critical theorists
celebrate the creation of greater choice in the construction of families, and free-
dom from the patriarchal constraints of gendered marriage norms.5 Today’s
decline in marriage rates, however, is a class-based affair that concentrates the
advantages of two-parent involvement on the children of the elite, further
entrenching class advantage. While fatherhood has been closely associated with
marriage, today paternity is almost as likely to be established outside of mar-
1 With apologies to Rick Banks, whose book, Is Marriage for White People?, inspired this
title. See RALPH RICHARD BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE? HOW THE AFRICAN
AMERICAN MARRIAGE DECLINE AFFECTS EVERYONE (2011).
* Edward A. Smith/Missouri Chair of Law, the Constitution and Society, University of
Missouri-Kansas City.
** John Theodore Fey Research Professor of Law, George Washington University Law
School. We would like to thank Nancy Levit for her comments on earlier drafts of this
article, Ann McGinley for inviting us, and Chris Kennedy for his research assistance.
2 See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Nancy Levit & Ann C. McGinley, Feminist Legal Theory
Meets Masculinities Theory, in MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL
APPROACH 25, 29 (Frank Rudy Cooper & Ann C. McGinley eds., 2012) (“Consistent with
the hierarchical relationships among men and the general dominance of men over women,
there is a dominant masculinity that reinforces who is at the top of the masculine heap.”).
3 For a thoughtful essay on the consequences of thinking of men and women apart from
each other, see Nancy Levit, Separate Silos: Marginalizing Men in Feminist Theory and
Forgetting Females in Masculinities Studies (Feb. 8, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1550365.
4 See, e.g., CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART: THE STATE OF WHITE AMERICA 1960–2010,
at 149–50 (2012); Amy L. Wax, Diverging Family Structure and “Rational” Behavior: The
Decline in Marriage as a Disorder of Choice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS
OF FAMILY LAW 15, 15 (Lloyd R. Cohen & Joshua D. Wright eds., 2011).
5 See, e.g., NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 6 (2008).
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riage as within, and the marital presumption itself has become increasingly
identified with class.6
Critical theory has yet to deal with the decline of marriage as a conse-
quence and cause of greater hierarchy. An egalitarian society might move away
from marriage toward a greater variety of families with support for all. A soci-
ety characterized by greater inequality reinforces social disadvantage through
family form.
At the core of these developments may be a central irony: feminist suc-
cess, in an unequal society, may reinforce the dominance of those “at the top of
the masculine heap.”7 In today’s society, this may be occurring because well-
off men appear to be better able either to perform the traditional breadwinner
role or to display more flexible attitudes toward gender roles and the division
of household tasks than the less successful. The most successful men want suc-
cessful wives. Wooing and keeping successful wives requires security in one’s
own success and identity and requires enough flexibility to manage dual careers
or complex roles.8 Less successful men, in contrast, are more likely to be influ-
enced by environments that define gender roles in traditional terms and view
male success in terms of the ability to succeed as a provider.9 Yet, the changing
economy has decimated the high paying jobs for blue-collar men that once
served as markers of male success without creating more flexible attitudes
toward gender.10 Employed blue-collar men help out more around the house
than the unemployed, and working class women who need to work because of
their partners’ unreliable income have become increasingly likely to leave men
who fail to contribute.11 The irony, therefore, is that the combination of
women’s greater independence with middle-class men’s more egalitarian gen-
der attitudes strengthens what has long been seen as a patriarchal institution—
6 The nonmarital birth rate is well over forty percent and, even when children are born into a
marriage, the marital presumption is no longer absolute. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn,
Marriage, Parentage, and Child Support, 45 FAM. L.Q. 219, 219 (2011); Leslie Joan Harris,
Questioning Child Support Enforcement Policy for Poor Families, 45 FAM. L.Q. 157, 160
(2011); June Carbone, Out of the Channel and into the Swamp: How Family Law Fails in a
New Era of Class Division, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 867–70 (2011).
7 Dowd et al., supra note 2, at 29.
8 Indeed, a significant force aggravating societal inequality is assortative mating, which
increases both overall family income and cognitive resources available for children. See
Ste´phane Mechoulan, Divorce Laws and the Structure of the American Family, 35 J. LEGAL
STUD. 143, 161–62 (2006) (attributing lower divorce rates to greater assortative mating);
Leslie McCall and Christine Percheski, Income Inequality: New Trends and Research Direc-
tions, 36 ANN. REV. SOC. 329, 336 (2010).
9 And a principal consequence of inability to perform expected masculine roles may be
greater family instability. See, e.g., PAUL R. AMATO ET AL., ALONE TOGETHER: HOW MAR-
RIAGE IN AMERICA IS CHANGING 122–23 (2007) (observing that working class couples
become more divorce prone if the woman is working full time because her husband does not
earn enough to support her); BANKS, supra note 1, at 99 (“Cecelia says it didn’t bother her
that her husband earned a lot less than she did. But the more I talked with her, the more it
seemed that in some basic way she did think less of him for it. It was as though he hadn’t
earned the right to make financial decisions.”).
10 See, e.g., LIZA MUNDY, THE RICHER SEX: HOW THE NEW MAJORITY OF FEMALE BREAD-
WINNERS IS TRANSFORMING SEX, LOVE, AND FAMILY 6 (2012).
11 See AMATO ET AL., supra note 9, at 138; discussion infra Part I.
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marriage—and, in doing so, increases greater class-based hierarchies that make
society as a whole more unequal.12
Critical theory interrogates the very notion of hierarchy; it has also long
recognized that hierarchies are interrelated.13 Masculinity theory has certainly
taken on the construction of gender within marriage, centering in large part on
the assumptions about, and reinforcement of, the male role as breadwinner.
Yet, it also recognizes that some men might be victimized even as others are
empowered by the expectations associated with such roles.14 While masculini-
ties theory has focused on the social and political constructs that have “men as
a group power over women as a group . . . [and] the engagement in or the
‘doing’ of these masculine practices by men or women,”15 masculinities theory
also examines how this structure disadvantages men who are unable to exercise
these privileges. The complement to this literature is greater development of the
ideal of equality and how it might aid the simultaneous dismantling of the hier-
archies associated with gender, families, and class.
The first two sections of this Article document the differences between
various groups of men with respect to education, employment, and marriages.
They show that aggregate figures mask striking class-based divergences. The
gendered wage gap, for example, has widened at the top and narrowed at the
bottom. The likelihood that a fourteen-year-old is being raised in a two-parent
family has increased for both African American and white college graduates,
while declining markedly for the rest of the population. These sections connect
growing economic inequality, which has affected men differently from women,
to increased family-based instability and financial stress.
The final section explores reasons for these divergences and briefly
sketches a partial picture of the solutions.16 The ideal solution, of course, is less
inequality in society generally; a more egalitarian society is more likely to pro-
mote more stable family relationships or to assuage the disadvantages associ-
12 Jason DeParle & Sabrina Tavernise, For Women Under 30, Most Births Occur Outside
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/us/for-women-
under-30-most-births-occur-outside-marriage.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all (“[E]ducated men
have also been quicker than their blue-collar peers to give women equal authority. ‘They are
more willing to play the partner role,’ said Sara McLanahan, a Princeton sociologist.”).
13 Indeed, the very idea of intersectionality rests on that notion. See, e.g., Kathy Davis,
Intersectionality as Buzzword: A Sociology of Science Perspective on What Makes A Femi-
nist Theory Successful, 9 FEMINIST THEORY 67, 67–68 (2008); see also Mary Anne C. Case,
Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law
and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1995); Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipo-
lar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy,
39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853, 853 (2006); Kimberle´ Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Inter-
sectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1241, 1242–43 (1991); Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dis-
mantle the Master’s House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 16, 17 (1995).
14 Dowd et al., supra note 2, at 29–30.
15 Id. at 25.
16 For additional solutions, see JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, WHAT REALLY HAPPENED
TO THE AMERICAN FAMILY (forthcoming 2013); June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The End of
Men or the Rebirth of Class? How Hanna Rosin Leaves Out the 1% & Family Law Fails the
Other 99% (George Washington Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012-148, 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2192587.
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ated with family form.17 Short of that, the solution requires addressing
community health, and a critical part of that involves male well-being. We are
in the midst of a long-term restructuring of the relationship between work and
family. The “homemaker” role, to which women have long been relegated, is
no longer sufficient to occupy the entire adult lifetime of either a man or a
woman. At the same time, “good jobs” with the flexibility to accommodate
family needs and the stability to provide a secure foundation for family life are
increasingly hard to come by. And, particularly in the United States, the transi-
tions between school and employment, home and work, one job and another
have become harder to manage, increasing relationship fragility. The successful
middle class, with better employment opportunities and more flexible work-
places, appears to have remade the gender expectations underlying family life.
The working class has neither embraced the new middle class formula nor tai-
lored more traditional expectations to the new economic realities. To address
increasing male inequality therefore requires examination of the interaction
between male socialization, employment and family. The result needs to revi-
talize men’s ability to participate in the workplace and their children’s lives
without recreating a “breadearner” role that subordinates women and deems
many men failures. We should not dismantle one hierarchy based on the subor-
dination of women only to replace it with a new one based on the intersection
of gender and class.
I. VARIATION BETWEEN MEN
A half-century ago, high rates of marriage were close to universal.18 The
one notable exception—and the subject of alarm in a much-vilified 1965 report
by Daniel Patrick Moynihan —involved lower-class African Americans, whose
divorce rates were high and non-marital birth rates were rising.19 Today, mar-
riage has emerged as a marker of class for the country as a whole. For the first
time ever, fewer than half of all households consist of married couples.20 More-
over, just like access to health care, stable employment, and higher education,
access to marriage has become a class-based affair. According to the National
Marriage Project, the likelihood of marrying, staying married, and raising chil-
17 For other discussions of the association of family and privilege, see MAXINE EICHNER,
THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS
(2010); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMI-
LIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 5, 7 (2006).
18 See, e.g., JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW
AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 54–55 (2011) (noting that marriage was nearly
universal in 1900 and that the percentage of women who had never been married by age
twenty-nine was 8.3% in 1960 for whites and 13% for blacks and in 2009, the percentage of
women between fifty and fifty-four who had ever been married was still 95% for whites, but
only 75% for blacks, down from 93% in 1980).
19 DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, UNITED STATES DEPT. OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: A CASE
FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965), available at http://www.blackpast.org/?q=primary/moyni-
han-report-1965.
20 Sabrina Tavernise, Married Couples Are No Longer a Majority, Census Finds, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 2011, at A22.
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dren within a two-parent family correlates strongly with education.21 Compared
to twenty years ago, the likelihood that a fourteen-year-old girl will be in a
family with both parents has risen for the children of college graduates and
fallen substantially for everyone else.22 In the midst of cries of alarms about
family decay, marital stability has increased for college graduates with declin-
ing divorce rates and non-marital birth rates that have stayed below ten
percent.23
The results have surprised almost everyone, and critical theorists should
be among the first to say that it wasn’t supposed to be this way. We recognized
that the relatively stable families of bygone eras came at a high price—the
wholesale subordination of women. A woman could not hope to manage chil-
dren without a husband and, as Susan Moller Okin observed, once a woman
had a husband and small children, her power within the family reached its
nadir.24 Moreover, the benefits of the family system, which directed women’s
energies toward their children’s education and moral supervision, remained
beyond the reach of working-class women who could not survive on their hus-
band’s earnings alone.25 Only in the relatively brief period at the end of World
War II did middle-class-family norms become close to universal. Even then,
they corresponded to early—not entirely voluntary—marriage, and a decline in
women’s educational parity with men.26 Almost as soon as these norms fully
took hold, moreover, they began to decay, as the Moynihan Report so dramati-
cally announced for poor African Americans in the sixties, setting the stage for
a new era of class division.27
21 See NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, WHEN MARRIAGE DISAPPEARS: THE NEW MIDDLE
AMERICA 56 (W. Bradford Wilcox ed., 2010), available at http://www.dss.virginia.gov/files/
about/sfi/intro_page/resources/marriage_dissapears.pdf.
22 See id. at xi.
23 See id. at 56. As in 1965, however, the notable exception to the rosy picture for family
stability, at least for the elite, comes from African Americans. While the white non-marital
birth rate for college graduates has stayed at two percent; for African American college
graduates, the numbers are rising and now approach the twenty-five percent level that caused
such alarm at the time of the Moynihan Report. Id. Still, the percentage of fourteen-year-old
girls living with both parents has increased for African American college graduates as well
as whites between 1982 and 2006. Id. at 57. See also discussion infra notes 75–77 and
accompanying text.
24 See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 4 (1989).
25 See JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY
LAW xiv–xv, 235 (2000).
26 Marriage rates for African American women exceeded white rates in the 1940s. GROSS-
MAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 18, at 54. For women’s falling education parity with men in
the post-war era, see Jerry A. Jacobs, Gender Inequality and Higher Education, 22 ANN.
REV. SOC. 153, 164 (1996).
27 MOYNIHAN, supra note 19. For a retrospective on the Moynihan Report, see Douglas S.
Massey & Robert J. Sampson, Moynihan Redux: Legacies and Lessons, 621 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 6, 6, 13 (2009). In their introduction, Massey and Sampson observe
that “Moynihan’s core argument was really rather simple: whenever males in any population
subgroup lack widespread access to reliable jobs, decent earnings, and key forms of socially
rewarded status, single parenthood will increase, with negative side effects on women and
children.” Id. at 13. See also Frank F. Furstenberg, If Moynihan Had Only Known: Race,
Class, and Family Change in the Late Twentieth Century, 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 94, 94–95 (2009) (restating Moynihan’s argument in terms of the intersection of
race and class).
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We believed that the sexual revolution of the sixties and seventies,
together with the movement remaking women’s lives, would dismantle the gen-
der hierarchies that allowed men to dominate women. The pill and abortion
would make women free to have sex “without consequences.”28 Access to the
paid labor market would make women independent. And, with the ability to
join the paid labor market on male terms and to reject the stigmas associated
with non-marital sexuality, we would be free to enter into the relationships of
our choosing—marriage or cohabitation, children within marriage or without,
individually negotiated divisions of family responsibility, and children as a
choice rather than as an obligation or source of identity. The older generation
had counseled that the “liberated” college women of the seventies would never
find husbands, and economist Claudia Goldin writes that the pill, in fact,
delayed marriage, allowing women time to enter the graduate programs and
professional jobs that had once been closed to them.29 Starting in the nineties,
moreover, these delayed marriages began to usher in a new era of family stabil-
ity, with the most highly educated women becoming the most likely to form
stable marriages, in part, because of shift in attitudes and workplace support for
elite dual earner unions.30 To our surprise, feminism and the sexual revolution
did not end the hierarchies of the past; they recreated different ones.31
The re-creation comes from two opposing forces, which play out by class.
The first involves the role of the family in skewing the resources available to
the next generation as successful men have become more likely to marry simi-
larly successful women. The second involves the role of greater male inequality
in aggravating class-based family instability as men have been both the biggest
winners and biggest losers in the post-industrial economy.
The new middle-class model responded to greater opportunities for
women by encouraging investment in both boys and girls, delaying marriage to
give successful men and women more time to establish their careers and find
compatible mates, and increasing the parental time and attention paid to chil-
dren.32 This model promises a huge payoff for those who can make it work:
The successful have become more likely to marry each other. Their two
incomes make them significantly better off than single individuals or working-
28 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
98 (1987).
29 Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and
Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions, 110 J. POL. ECON. 730, 731, 747 (2002).
30 See NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note 21, at 16 (indicating that highly-educated
couples are more likely to stay married raising children); see Sara McLanahan, Diverging
Destinies: How Children Are Faring Under the Second Demographic Transition, 41
DEMOGRAPHY 607, 607–08 (2004).
31 Compare NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL
POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 1–2 (2010) (describing “blue” system as the
new pathway to middle class status and “red” traditionalism as blocking the universalization
of the new norms), with KAY S. HYMOWITZ, MANNING UP: HOW THE RISE OF WOMEN HAS
TURNED MEN INTO BOYS 4 (2011) (describing the independence of women as undermining
males). See also CLAUDIA GOLDIN & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, THE RACE BETWEEN EDUCATION
AND TECHNOLOGY 7–8 (2008) (exploring the relationship between education and middle
class status).
32 See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 31, at 1 (we have previously termed this new model
“blue”).
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class families. They have become even more likely to produce high-quality
children. Their marriages have become more likely to last with divorce rates
similar to those in the mid-sixties, before the era of no-fault divorce.33 But, the
investment needed to realize the advantages of middle-class life have increased.
The families most likely to be stable are those of college graduates that form
families later in life,34 and postponing marriage and childbearing until the late
twenties requires discipline and support.35 These unions last in part because the
couples’ greater income allows them to procure the assistance necessary to vin-
dicate both workplace and domestic obligations. The most stable families may
well be those in which neither spouse does the housework.36
Those factors are increasingly hard to marshal for a large part of the popu-
lation. As the industrial era gave way to the information economy, the new
economy remade women’s roles. The new economy simultaneously increased
the demand for women’s labor in the workforce and created labor-saving
devices (and McDonald’s) that reduce the amount of time devoted to the home.
The result has increased the demand for women’s workforce participation and
remade housekeeping so that it no longer commands full-time attention. The
new economy, however, eliminated the high-paid jobs once available for less-
skilled men.37 As a result, the “male premium,” whereby men could count on
earning more than women, by virtue of gender alone, has disappeared for a
large part of the population. It has been replaced by a “college premium” that
rewards the better educated.38 At the same time, stagnating male income has
made women’s workforce participation more important than ever.39
Investment in women’s income potential pays off accordingly, and the
new economy, while continuing to generate high paying jobs for the most suc-
cessful men, has increased income inequality for the country as a whole and has
increased women’s overall opportunities more than men’s.40 In addition, as
women enjoy more autonomy, they do have greater ability to determine which
relationships to embrace, which to leave, and which partners, if any, to include
in rearing children. Within this context, marriage becomes a choice that can be
33 McLanahan, supra note 30, at 608.
34 Id. See also GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 18, at 53–54 (summarizing factors
predicting divorce).
35 Considerable debate occurs over whether the marriages of college graduates have become
more stable because the successful marry later or because those who marry later are more
likely to be successful and to find similarly successful partners. For purposes of our argu-
ment in this article, the direction of the causality does not matter. In either case, it increases
class advantage. See, e.g., Mechoulan, supra note 8, at 147.
36 See AMATO ET AL., supra note 9, at 138.
37 See, e.g., Peter Whoriskey, U.S. Manufacturing Sees Shortage of Skilled Factory Work-
ers, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/us -
manufacturing-sees-shortage-of-skilled-factory-workers/2012/02/17/gIQAo0MLOR_story
.html; Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, Long-Run Changes in the U.S. Wage Structure:
Narrowing, Widening, Polarizing 3 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
13,568, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13568.
38 See, e.g., GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 31, 51–52.
39 RICHARD FRY & D’VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., WOMEN, MEN AND THE NEW
ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE 8 (2010).
40 Id.
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redefined to express individual preferences or changing expectations about
family roles.
Stanford Law Professor Richard Banks began to address these issues in
the context of the enormous disparity between the marriage rates of black men
and black women, noting that the issue is no longer one limited to the black
underclass with African American college graduate non-marital birth rates
creeping up well ahead of white rates.41 Nonetheless, marriage has effectively
disappeared from the poorest communities: the non-marital birth rate for black
high school dropouts is 96%, and 77% for white high school dropouts.42 The
number of blacks with a college degree in intact first marriages is more than
double (44%) the rate for those who have not graduated from high school
(21%), and the number of white high school dropouts in an intact first marriage
is just over 30%.43
Underlying the marriage statistics is a growing gender imbalance, one
exacerbated by race and class. Women’s educational accomplishments increas-
ingly exceed men’s at every level. Today, women earn 57% of bachelor’s
degrees, 60% of master’s degrees, and 52% of doctorates.44 Among African
Americans, the disparities are even greater; nearly twice as many women, for
example, earn bachelor’s degrees as do the men.45 In graduate school, black
women outnumber men almost two to one.46 The relatively small number of
African American men who “make it” have a large number of women from
which to choose.
The result is affecting the role of marriage in the country as a whole.
Nationally, women of all races graduate from high school and college at higher
rates than the men. The sole remaining bastions of male predominance are the
high end of the income ladder and the more lucrative graduate and professional
fields; these elites are the only group in society for whom marriage remains the
dominant form of family organization. For those without college degrees of
every race, male wage levels, employment opportunities, and stability have
fallen, while they have risen for women.47 The African American poor have
never recovered from the loss of inner-city jobs a half century ago nor have
they benefitted economically from the civil rights revolution that opened doors
41 See BANKS, supra note 1, at 8–9.
42 NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note 21, at 56.
43 Id. at 55.
44 Liza Mundy, Women, Money and Power, TIME (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,2109140,00.html; see also Int’l Herald Trib., Women Earning
More Doctoral Degrees than Men in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2010), http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/09/20/education/20iht-educBriefs20.html?_r=0 (reporting that women earned
50.4% of doctoral degrees awarded and 60% of all master’s degrees awarded in the 2008–09
school year); see also NAT’L SCI. BOARD, SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2012, at
2-21 (2012) (reporting that “[s]ince the late 1990s, women have earned about 57% of all
bachelor’s degrees and about half of all [science and engineering] bachelor’s degrees.”),
available at www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind12/pdfstart.htm.
45 See SUSAN AUD ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., The
Condition of Education 2012, at 112 (2012) (reporting that “Black females earned 68 percent
of associate’s degrees, 66 percent of bachelor’s degrees, 71 percent of master’s degrees, and
65 percent of all doctor’s degrees awarded to Black students” in 2009–10).
46 See id.
47 See Mundy, supra note 44.
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for highly skilled professionals. While the mismatch between men and women
produces heartache for middle-class African American women, the much
greater gender imbalance in poor communities reinforces class lines and
reduces the life chances of children born to everyone else. The ultimate prob-
lem is a society that treats a high percentage of all men as disposable.














Both highly educated men and women have gained in comparison with
other workers. They also have become more likely than others to marry and
stay married. Moreover, the fact that most women gained compared to most
men does not mean that gender equality increased for the population as a
whole. The ratio between male and female wages had stayed the same for
decades. In the seventies and eighties, the gap narrowed and did so overwhelm-
ingly because of increases in income to highly skilled women.49 Comparing
1990 with 2008, however, the figures have begun to diverge strikingly by edu-
cation. Looking at gross figures, that is, the percentage of men’s median
income earned by women without controlling for any characteristic other than
education, the wage gap over the last twenty years narrowed the most for the
least-educated women while the gap between men and women increased for
the most educated:
48 See McLanahan, supra note 30, at 614.
49 Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The U.S. Gender Pay Gap in the 1990s: Slowing
Convergence 17–18 (Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Section, Working Paper No. 508,
2006), available at http://www.irs.princeton.edu/pubs/pdfs/508.pdf (finding that in the sev-
enties and eighties wage gains for married women tended to be greatest for women married
to middle and high wage men).
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In 1990, the wage gap did not vary greatly by education, and, to the extent
it did, highly educated women earned a higher percentage of male income than
less-educated women. By 2008, the relationship between education and the
wage gap changed direction, with the least-educated women earning a much
higher percentage of male income than the most educated. More sophisticated
decomposition studies confirm the trends. At the ninetieth percentile, the gap
between men and women that cannot be explained by controlling for education,
job experience or type of employment increases in the nineties. Indeed, looking
just at white college graduates with fifteen years of experience, the gap at the
ninetieth percentile becomes even more extreme, with women “losing substan-
tial ground.”51 Over the last thirty years, the men at the top have steadily
gained ground at the expense of everyone else. In the bottom half of the popu-
lation, however, the women have outpaced the men.
This takes us to the third factor, which exacerbates the impact on family
life: employment stability. The length the average man or woman stays in a
particular job has diminished substantially over the last thirty years, but the
impact has been substantially greater for the working class. Consider this chart
from the Social Security Administration showing the length of time an
employee is likely to be out of the labor force over the course of thirty-five
years:
50 Median Annual Income, by Level of Education, 1990–2009, INFOPLEASE, http://www.info
please.com/ipa/A0883617.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2013).
51 Blau & Kahn, supra note 49, at 23.
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For the top twenty-five percent of workers (bar labeled “highest”), there is
very little change between those born before and after 1945. Lack of employ-
ment increases slightly for the third quartile (bar labeled “third”). It triples,
however, for the second quartile (bar labeled “second”) and doubles for the
lowest quartile (bar labeled “lowest”). These workers report no earnings for
twenty-three out of thirty-five of their peak earning years.
Other studies similarly show that male employment stability, measured by
changes in jobs, has steadily declined for most of the period since World War
II.53 Women’s employment stability increased steadily for each generation of
women born through 1960 (a group that would have entered the job market in
the eighties), and then steadily declines.54 Looking just at the men, these
changes in job instability play out largely by class.55
52 See Chad Newcomb, Distribution of Zero-Earning Years by Gender, Birth Cohort, and
Level of Lifetime Earnings 8 (U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., Note No. 2000-02, 2000), available at
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/rsnotes/rsn2000-02.html.
53 See Henry S. Farber, Is the Company Man an Anachronism? Trends in Long-Term
Employment in the United States, 1973 to 2006, in THE PRICE OF INDEPENDENCE: THE ECO-
NOMICS OF EARLY ADULTHOOD 56, 69–70 (Sheldon Danziger & Cecilia Elena Rouse eds.,
2007).
54 Id.
55 For a broader discussion of these trends, see ARNE L. KALLEBERG, GOOD JOBS, BAD
JOBS: THE RISE OF POLARIZED AND PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1970S TO 2000S, at 93 (2011) (observing that aggregate figures sometimes show
relatively little change in job stability in the United States, but the average cloaks important
differences as employment instability has increased for men, but not women, high school
graduates and dropouts, but not the college educated, blacks more than whites, and some age
groups more than others).
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In the 1970s, the differences in job instability did not vary much by educa-
tion. After 2000, the job instability figures for the most educated remain about
the same as the figures for the seventies. But, they increased by a third for the
other two groups.
Job instability may affect relationships as much as, if not more than, low
wages. The male-breadwinner role continues to define male success, and the
loss of both status and income that comes with lesser employment causes many
men who cannot meet the expectations associated with the breadwinner role “to
be deemed as failures by society, themselves, and their partners.”57 Indeed,
Newsweek reported that the American Time Use Survey showed that “laid-off
men tend to do less—not more—housework, eating up their extra hours snack-
ing, sleeping and channel surfing (which might be why the Cartoon Network,
whose audience has grown by 10 percent during the downturn, is now running
more ads for refrigerator repair school).”58 According to the same study, unem-
ployed women spend twice as much time taking care of children and doing
chores as men.59 Unemployed men are also right behind alcoholics and drug
addicts as the group most likely to beat their female partners.60 And, a study in
Great Britain found that increases in those seeking counseling for sexual
problems increased in direct proportion to the unemployment rate.61
Almost two decades ago, sociologist Lillian Rubin found that when these
factors combine, family breakup often follows. She describes one mother of
small children who explained:
56 NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note 21, at 43; see also W. Bradford Wilcox et al., No
Money, No Honey, No Church: The Deinstitutionalization of Religious Life Among the White
Working Class, in 23 RELIGION, WORK AND INEQUALITY 227, 245 (Lisa A. Keister et al.
eds., 2012) (noting that “in the last 40 years, white working class income, employment,
marital stability, and cultural conservatism have all declined—and markedly more so than
they have for college-educated whites”).
57 See Sara McLanahan & Christine Percheski, Family Structure and the Reproduction of
Inequalities, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 257, 261 (2008).
58 Tony Dokoupil, Men Will Be Men: When Guys Lose Jobs, the TV, Den and Gym Win.
Women? Sex? Not So Much, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 2, 2009, at 50.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 LILLIAN B. RUBIN, FAMILIES ON THE FAULT LINE: AMERICA’S WORKING CLASS SPEAKS
ABOUT THE FAMILY, THE ECONOMY, RACE, AND ETHNICITY 119 (1994).
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“I don’t know, maybe we could have made it if he hadn’t lost his job” . . . “I mean,
we had problems before, but we were managing. Then he got laid off, and he
couldn’t find another job, and, I don’t know, it was like he went crazy. He was
drinking; he hit me; he was mean to the kids. There was no talking to him, so I left,
took the kids and went home to my mom’s.”
When she came back, her husband was gone and a year later, no one had seen
him.62
The relationship between employment and divorce is a complex one. High
overall rates of unemployment lower divorce.63 Couples often feel either that
they cannot afford to divorce, postponing the breakup, or that the job loss
reflects bad times rather than poor character. Unemployment due to a plant
closing or disability, for example, is less likely to break up a marriage than an
individual layoff.64 Nonetheless, changes in employment affect long-term
expectations about marriage and family, and increases in male unemployment
have a greater impact on family stability than increases in female unemploy-
ment.65 The Great Recession, for example, which has at least temporarily
reduced divorce rates, has also decreased marriage rates.66 And, it may have
permanent effects on the next generation’s expectations about family. Taken
together with a long-term decline in the wages of unskilled men, increases in
job instability, especially for those who do not graduate from college, and a
corresponding increase in women’s educational achievement, wages, and
employment stability, the economy has remade the terms of the marriage mar-
ket. While the result has increased the family stability of the best off, it is
increasingly calling into question the value of marriage for everyone else.
II. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FAMILY
The final piece of the picture is the class-based increase in non-marital
births. Starting with the Moynihan Report, this has been the part of the chang-
ing family that has attracted the most study and concern. The changes, how-
ever, are still striking. When the age of marriage began to rise for the college
educated in the seventies, so too did the age of first birth. The result postponed
family formation and lowered overall fertility. For high school graduates, the
big drop in marriage for those in their early twenties came in the nineties—and
it correlated strongly with an increase in non-marital births.67
62 Id. at 120.
63 See Judith K. Hellerstein & Melinda Sandler Morrill, Booms, Busts, and Divorce, 11 B.E.
J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 3 (2011).
64 Kerwin Kofi Charles & Melvin Stephens, Jr., Job Displacement, Disability, and Divorce,
22 J. LAB. ECON. 489, 490 (2004).
65 Liana C. Sayer et al., She Left, He Left: How Employment and Satisfaction Affect
Women’s and Men’s Decisions to Leave Marriages, 116 AM. J. SOC. 1982, 1985 (2011).
66 See W. BRADFORD WILCOX, THE GREAT RECESSION AND MARRIAGE 4 (2011), available
at  http://www.thefamilywatch.org/doc/doc-0221-es.pdf (reporting that “divorce rates have
fallen since the Great Recession began”). See also D’Vera Cohn et al., Barely Half of U.S.
Adults Are Married—A Record Low: New Marriages Down 5% from 2009 to 2010, PEW
RES. SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/
12/14/barely-half-of-u-s-adults-are-married-a-record-low/ (“Fallout from the Great Reces-
sion may be a factor in the recent decrease in newlyweds . . . .”).
67 See Goldin & Katz, supra note 29, at 747–48.
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The results are even more dramatic when race is taken into account. The
non-marital birth rate for white college graduates has remained at two percent,
with no change in the twenty-five year period that started in the mid-eighties.69
The delay in marriage produced a delay in births but not a lack of emphasis on
marriage. While marriage decreased for all groups between 1970 and today,
marriage has declined the least for college graduates, and, today, women with
college degrees are the most likely to marry and the most likely to raise their
children within a two-parent family.70 Indeed, sociologist Brad Wilcox has
found that a fourteen-year-old daughter of college graduates is more likely to
be raised in a two-parent home in 2006–08 than in the early eighties.71
For those without college degrees, in contrast, a delay in marriage has
meant an increase in non-marital births—and in those likely to never marry.
For the most disadvantaged women, non-marital birth rates were already high
in 1982.72 For African Americans without a high school degree, for example,
the non-marital birth rate increased from 77% to 96%. The group that exper-
ienced the largest increase in the period from the mid-eighties until 2008, how-
ever, was white high school graduates. The non-marital birth rate for this group
was 5% in 1982, just barely higher than the rate for college graduates. By 2008,
the rate had increased to 34%, close to the 43% rate for white high school drop-
outs. African American high school graduates also became much more likely to
give birth outside of marriage during the same period, with the percentage of
non-marital births rising from 48% to 75%.73 Moreover, the huge recent expan-
sion in the non-marital birth rate has largely been to women in their twenties;
teen births have fallen across the board.74
68 NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note 21, at 23.
69 Id. at 56.
70 Id. at 58.
71 Id. at 57.
72 Id. at 23.
73 Id. at 56.
74 STEPHANIE J. VENTURA, DIVISION OF VITAL STATISTICS, CHANGING PATTERNS OF
NONMARITAL CHILDBEARING IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (Nat’l Ctr. For Health Statistics ed.,
2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db18.pdf.
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These results suggest that college education has shifted family formation,
including both marriage and childbearing, into the thirties. In the meantime, the
women who do not complete college are ready to bear children much earlier.
This has led to two sharply different search strategies: college-graduate women
continue to wait to have children until they have found the right male partner,
while non-college graduates may decide to have children whether or not a suit-
able partner is in the offing.
The result closely tracks the changing job fortunes that, first, increased the
divorce rate and, then, persuaded the children of divorce that marriage simply
does not work. Brad Wilcox captures the change in attitudes. He asked a group
ranging from twenty-five to forty-four whether “marriage has not worked out
for most of the people they know.”76 The results correlate strongly with educa-
tion. Of those with the least education, over half (53%) say yes, marriage has
not worked out for most of the people they know. Of those with moderate
amounts of education, the number drops to 43%. Of the most highly educated,
only 17% agree; that is, 83% indicate that marriage has worked for most of the
people they know.77
These figures also correlate with class-based shifts in attitudes toward
divorce, sexuality and non-marital births. Between the early eighties and today,
the least educated have become thirteen percent less likely to believe that
divorce should be more difficult to obtain, where the most educated have
moved in the opposite direction, believing that divorce should be more difficult
to get.78 Asked whether pre-marital sex is “always wrong,” a majority of all
groups disagree and the better educated, today and twenty-five years ago, are
more likely to disagree. But over those twenty-five years, the least educated
have adopted more flexible attitudes on the issue while the most educated have
become somewhat more conservative.79 And, unsurprisingly, college graduates
75 NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, supra note 21, at 56.
76 Id. at 40.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 29.
79 Id. at 30.
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are much more likely to report that they would be “embarrassed” by a non-
marital pregnancy than those farther down the educational ladder.80
Ethnographic studies capture the changes in behavior and thinking that
underlie the changes in attitude. Wilcox, along with a number of other sociolo-
gists, describes the change as one from institutional marriage to “soul mate”
marriage. He observes that:
[M]any Americans have moved away from identifying with an “institutional” model
of marriage, which seeks to integrate sex, parenthood, economic cooperation, and
emotional intimacy in a permanent union. This model has been overwritten by the
“soul mate” model, which sees marriage as primarily a couple-centered vehicle for
personal growth, emotional intimacy, and shared consumption that depends for its
survival on the happiness of both spouses.81
When looking at the shift in attitudes that underlie decisions not to marry,
however, something else emerges: a conviction that institutional marriage is
unlikely to work and that it is unlikely to do so, at least in part, because men are
just too unreliable. When Wilcox finds that less-educated Americans do not see
marriage working for those around them, he is describing the same conclusion
Amato found: for those further down the economic ladder, good marriages have
become harder to achieve, financial stress has contributed more than it did in
earlier times to family instability, and the difficulties associated with making
marriage work have persuaded more women to have children on their own.
The most celebrated study of these attitudes is Kathy Edin’s.82 Other
scholars often cite Edin for the conclusion that poor women fail to marry not
because they do not value marriage, but because they value it too much. She
quotes poor women who believe that they should wait to marry until they can
achieve the “white picket fence,” that is, until they and their partner can afford
a stable residence, a car and bills that are paid every month. Sociologists refer
to these attitudes as a “marriage bar,” that is, “the standard of living a couple is
expected to obtain before they marry.”83 Some studies suggest that the greater
the male income inequality in a community, the higher the number of couples
that will fail to meet the marriage bar.84 McLanahan and Percheski, for exam-
ple, explain that the marriage bar is likely to be “a function of the median
income of married couples” and it is therefore likely to rise “as marriage
becomes increasingly concentrated among high-income couples.”85
This notion that a single mother is somehow better off on her own or
cohabitating than married mystifies observers. Almost every study indicates
that poor couples are better off pooling their resources than fending for them-
selves, and that, for all but the most violent couples, the children tend to do
better if their parents stay together.86 What emerges from Edin’s book is not
just a refusal to marry because it does not meet a soul mate ideal, but rather
80 Id. at 31.
81 Id. at 38.
82 See generally KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR
WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE (2005).
83 McLanahan & Percheski, supra note 57, at 261.
84 See, e.g., Eric D. Gould & M. Daniele Paserman, Waiting for Mr. Right: Rising Inequal-
ity and Declining Marriage Rates, 53 J. URBAN ECON. 257, 257–58 (2003).
85 McLanahan & Percheski, supra note 57, at 261.
86 See, e.g., Wax, supra note 4, at 30.
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wariness of the potentially high costs of marriages that fail. When Edin exam-
ines unstable relationships, she emphasizes that:
[M]oney is seldom the primary reason mothers give to explain why they and their
children’s fathers are no longer together. . . . It is the drug and alcohol abuse, the
criminal behavior and consequent incarceration, the repeated infidelity, and the pat-
terns of intimate violence that are the villains looming largest in poor mothers’
accounts of relational failure.87
In short, the biggest issue is the behavior of men at the losing end of male-
status hierarchies.
With these expectations, women need independence to protect themselves
from violent and unfaithful men, and they see the inability to rely on stable
behavior as a potential threat to their own and their children’s well-being. Edin
thus explains the desire for greater financial stability before marriage as a
desire for female independence. Many of the women she interviews do say that
they want a house and car, ideally titled in their name alone, before they marry.
Edin emphasizes that they want these assets so that they “can control their
mate’s behavior with the threat—spoken or not—that they’ll end the marriage
and remove the children if their husband cheats, beats them, fails to stay work-
ing, or tries to make all the decisions.”88 Financial independence means free-
dom from the dominating behavior of a husband. Moreover, when the women
do complain about money, it is often about the failure of their partner to hold a
steady job or about perceptions that he has become a net drain on the family’s
finances. She describes one woman who told her, “He’s not around no more. I
got rid of him. . . . He was only here to sleep—didn’t want to pay no bills,
didn’t want to do nothing. When he was here all he did was fight and argue and
drink. I had to get rid of [him].”89 The women in Edin’s study often see the
father of their children as someone who may meet some of their needs at the
expense of the children. Edin concludes that “few mothers are willing to endan-
ger the resources they and their children desperately need just to keep the
baby’s father around.”90
In these accounts, low wages are a small part of the explanation for rela-
tionship instability and the refusal to marry. Yet, steady employment would
certainly contribute to more responsible behavior. The opportunities for such
employment, however, have declined. For the population as a whole, more than
fourteen percent of whites and a quarter of African American men reported
fifty-two weeks or more of non-work between the ages of twenty-four and
twenty-six.91 For the least-advantaged men, prison has become the single insti-
tution most likely to shape the transition to adulthood. Steven Raphael reports
that:
Young men in their early twenties are especially likely to have served time. Their
risk of imprisonment has tripled between 1979 and 2001. For all racial and ethnic
groups, less-educated men are considerably more likely to be incarcerated than more
87 See EDIN & KEFALAS, supra note 82, at 81.
88 Id. at 112.
89 Id. at 77 (internal quotation marks omitted).
90 Id. at 81.
91 See Fast Facts: Work and Education, NETWORK ON TRANSITIONS TO ADULTHOOD, http://
transitions.s410.sureserver.com/?page_id=858 (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
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educated men. However, less-educated black men have the highest incarceration
rates. The author calculates, using California prison data, that 90% of black male
high school dropouts now aged 45 to 54 have been or are in jail.92
The women in their communities have reason to be wary. Yet, these
women do not want to forego child rearing entirely. As they achieve a measure
of independence, they do demand more before they will marry. And as their
prospects improve, while the opportunities for less-skilled men decline, mar-
riage is likely to be a casualty. The reason ultimately has to do with the way
that growing male inequality combines with gender change to remake the atti-
tudes of rich and poor in parallel directions that drive us farther apart.
For the approximately two-thirds of the population that does not have a
college degree, an increasing number of men do not have the steady, adequately
paying jobs that allow them to provide the foundation for a successful family
life. Nor are working-class men who feel like failures in the job market pre-
pared to play roles backing up their wives and children. College-educated art-
ists or faculty spouses may be willing to dote on their children while their
wives take on the “breadwinning” role, but less-secure men are more likely to
chafe at the perceived loss in status. Financially independent women who both
bring the bulk of the family income and assume the majority of the domestic
tasks do not want—or need—men who are unable to support their families,
emotionally or financially.
III. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
There are three possible visions of the future. The first is that women’s
growing power will eclipse men at every level and when that happens, middle-
class women will join with working-class women in dismantling marriage.
Women’s educational achievement already exceeds men’s in the nation as a
whole, and women will soon dominate professions such as law and medicine.93
Single, childless women ages twenty-two to thirty already out earn male peers
of the same age in the majority of large U.S. cities.94 If women out earn men at
the top as well as the bottom of the country’s income ladder, marriage may no
longer correspond so closely to class or confer the same degree of financial
advantage. The result could be a reorganization of society to provide greater
support for childrearing outside of the two-parent family.
Today, the class-based disparity in marriage rates is troubling, at least as a
matter of social policy, because elite groups continue to provide for children
overwhelmingly through committed two-parent relationships, often opposing
support for other families. Welfare reform is only the most visible of the many
measures that have reduced the support for single-parent families in the name
92 Steven Raphael, Early Incarceration Spells and the Transition to Adulthood, 31 NET-
WORK ON TRANSITIONS TO ADULTHOOD: POL’Y BRIEF 1 (Sept. 2006), http://www.transad.
pop.upenn.edu/downloads/raphael-formatted.pdf. See also Steven Raphael, Early Incarcera-
tion Spells and the Transition to Adulthood, in THE PRICE OF INDEPENDENCE: THE ECONOM-
ICS OF EARLY ADULTHOOD, supra note 53, at 278, 278 (demonstrating that incarceration
delays or derails more conventional aspects of that transition such as employment, education,
marriage, and living independent).
93 Mundy, supra note 44.
94 Id.
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of marriage promotion.95 Even some programs undertaken in the guise of help-
ing single mothers, such as child-support enforcement, in fact, make matters
worse.96 It is possible to envision an alternative future in which family form is
less critical to children’s success. Martha Fineman, for example, argues that
families vary and a state that supports the welfare of children needs to support
child rearing in all families, married or not.97 If single-parent families were not
associated with class disadvantage, it is easier to imagine a societal reorganiza-
tion that devoted greater shared resources to child well-being.
We are skeptical, however, that such a future is politically feasible for at
least two reasons. The first is the role of increasing inequality in concentrating
political power in the hands of very wealthy conservatives, who are over-
whelmingly male.98 Even if women have gained increasing income and influ-
ence in society as a whole, the same has not been true at the top. As we noted
above, the gendered wage gap has increased for college graduates since 1990.
A substantial reason is that the largest gender gaps tend to be in financial-sector
jobs and those have shown some of the largest increases in compensation over
the last two decades.99 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found, for
example, that between 1932 and 1980, compensation inside the financial indus-
95 See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (2012)); Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Overview, HHS.GOV/RECOVERY, http://www.hhs.
gov/recovery/programs/tanf/tanf-overview.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (explaining that
a major goal of TANF is to “reduc[e] the dependency of needy parents by promoting job
preparation, work and marriage”).
96 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 6, at 158; see also Deborah Harris, Child Support for Wel-
fare Families: Family Policy Trapped in its Own Rhetoric, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 619, 619–20 (1988) (“[T]he child support enforcement system is fundamentally
flawed, imposing tremendous burdens on welfare mothers without saving welfare dollars.”);
Cutting Programs for Low-Income People Especially Hurts Women and Their Families,
NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CENTER (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.nwlc.org/resource/cutting-pro-
grams-low-income-people-especially-hurts-women-and-their-families (explaining that single
moms, relying on welfare, will be disproportionally hurt by budget cuts involved in fiscal
cliff discussions).
97 See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY
140–41 (2004); MCCLAIN, supra note 17, at 131, 154 (discussing the importance of provid-
ing support for children irrespective of family form as a matter of equal citizenship); see also
EICHNER, supra note 17, at 5 (suggesting that the state should balance support for marriage
against the minimum needs of all children).
98 See Thomas Frank, Too Smart to Fail: Notes on an Age of Folly, BAFFLER NO. 19, http://
thebaffler.com/notebook/2012/03/too_smart_to_fail (last visited Mar. 19, 2013); see also
David A. Matsa & Amalia R. Miller, Chipping Away at the Glass Ceiling: Gender Spillovers
in Corporate Leadership 1 (Rand Labor and Population, Working Paper No. WR-842,
2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1709462 (finding
that in the corporate realm, only six percent of top corporate executives are female); Matt
Bai, How Much Has Citizens United Changed the Political Game?, N.Y. TIMES (July 17,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/magazine/how-much-has-citizens-united -
changed-the-political-game.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0&pagewanted=print.
99 See Frank Bass, Shining Shoes Best Way Wall Street Women Outearn Men, Bloomberg
(Mar. 16, 2012, 10:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-16/shining-shoes-
best-way-wall-street-women-outearn-men.html (“The six jobs with the largest gender gap in
pay and at least 10,000 men and 10,000 women were in the Wall Street-heavy financial
sector: insurance agents, managers, clerks, securities sales agents, personal advisers and
other specialists.”); see also Lawrence Mishel & Natalie Sabadish, It’s Executives and the
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try and out was roughly equal.100 Beginning in 1980, pay levels grew apart, and
by 2007, financial sector compensation was more than eighty percent greater
than in other businesses.101 Indeed, some scholars maintain that the growth of
the financial sector, together of course with the increase in CEO compensation
tied to stock options, is the major cause of increasing inequality more gener-
ally.102 As long as these factors hold, women are unlikely to catch up with men
at the top.
Second, conservatives are likely to oppose more egalitarian policies, and
elite conservative women seem as likely as elite conservative men to prefer
marriage-focused policies and to oppose more egalitarian measures generally.
Political science data show that elites are more polarized in their views than the
rank and file, and that elite conservative Republican men and women tend to be
much more supportive of hierarchy and the traditional family than other groups
in society.103
The second possible vision for the future is to bring back patriarchy. The
“war on women,” which targets women’s reproductive autonomy, seems
designed to increase the risks of sexual intercourse by re-stigmatizing women’s
sexual autonomy, particularly outside of marriage.104 Conservative rhetoric
focusing on the importance of the traditional married family also emphasizes
the importance of wives’ deference to their husbands.105 We have argued else-
where that custody and parentage cases in more conservative parts of the coun-
try have given fathers more influence, in effect making sexually independent
women more subject to male authority.106
We believe that these efforts have had increasingly harmful consequences
on poor women. They have reduced access to contraception and abortion and
Finance Sector Causing Surging 1% Income Growth!, WORKING ECON. (May 2, 2012, 3:22
PM), http://www.epi.org/blog/ceo-pay-finance-sector-income-inequality/.
100 THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 61
(2011).
101 Id.
102 See, e.g., Carlo Panico, Antonio Pinto & Martı´n Puchet Anyul, Income Distribution and
the Size of the Financial Sector: A Sraffian Analysis, 36 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 1455, 1455
(2012); see also Lawrence Mishel & Natalie Sabadish, CEO Pay and the Top 1%, ECON.
POL’Y INST. (May 2, 2012), http://www.epi.org/publication/ib331-ceo-pay-top-1-percent/.
103 See, e.g., Morris P. Fiorina & Samuel J. Abrams, Political Polarization in the American
Public, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 563, 565 (2008) (agreeing that elites are more polarized but
disputing the evidence of mass polarization); Geoffrey C. Layman, Thomas M. Carsey &
Juliana Menasce Horowitz, Party Polarization in American Politics: Characteristics,
Causes, and Consequences, 9 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 83, 104 (2006) (explaining that increased
polarization among party activists increases mass polarization); Ted G. Jelen & Clyde Wil-
cox, Causes and Consequences of Public Attitudes Toward Abortion: A Review and
Research Agenda, 56 POL. RES. Q. 489, 495 (2003) (arguing that characteristics of legisla-
tors, not the characteristics of voters in the district, best predicted votes on abortion-related
issues and legislators tended to have more extreme views than their constituents).
104 See, e.g., Elizabeth Wood, Sexual Freedom, The War on Women, and Nuclear (Family)
Destruction, WOODHULL SEXUAL FREEDOM ALLIANCE (Apr. 6, 2012), http://www.woodhull
alliance.org/2012/sex-in-the-public-square/sexual-freedom-the-war-on-women-and-nuclear-
family-destruction/.
105 See W. Bradford Wilcox & Steven L. Nock, What’s Love Got To Do With It? Equality,
Equity, Commitment and Women’s Marital Quality, 84 SOC. FORCES 1321, 1322–23 (2006).
106 See Carbone, supra note 6, at 878–79; Carbone & Cahn, supra note 6, at 220.
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contributed to the increased class-based disparities in unintended pregnancy.107
Access to the Pill serves to increase women’s earning power; restrictions on
that access also threaten women’s economic autonomy.108 But, we have no
reason to believe that conservatives will succeed in reversing women’s educa-
tional and income gains, which are due in part to larger economic forces. With-
out that, they are unlikely to bring back an emphasis on marriage or to succeed
in wholesale limitations on contraception.
The third—and much preferred—solution is greater equality in society
more generally. That will require more jobs, particularly more stable blue-col-
lar jobs for men, and a reknitted social safety net that encourages family stabil-
ity when employment stability is infeasible. Complementing greater economic
stability should be more egalitarian gender attitudes that allow for the renegoti-
ation of the relationship between work and family.
Inequality is a problem in itself. Greater societal inequality, first, dispro-
portionately affects men on the losing end of the socio-economic ladder, and,
then, because it writes off such a high proportion of men, affects women and
children through its negative feedback effects on family life. Cross-cultural
studies of inequality indicate that the higher the inequality in a society, the
higher the rates of chronic unemployment, imprisonment and violence, which
disproportionately affect men’s attractiveness as intimate partners, teen births,
and mental illness and substance abuse more generally.109 Moreover, examina-
tions of inequality indicate that the greater the inequality in male incomes, the
lower marriage rate at age thirty—for both the winners and the losers in the
income hierarchy.110 While high-status men will still marry more than low-
status men, the high-status men are less likely to be married in cities with
higher-income inequality than comparable men elsewhere.111 Greater female-
income inequality has no such effect. We suspect, therefore, that strengthening
families will require both restraining the growth of the one percent and improv-
ing the conditions for everyone else. Such a wholesale societal reconstruction is
beyond the scope of this paper, but it is one that necessarily involves a focus on
employment. “Jobs now” should be the true family values slogan.
107 See Rachel Benson Gold, Rekindling Efforts to Prevent Unplanned Pregnancy: A Matter
of “Equity and Common Sense”, 9 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 2, 3–4 (2006); see also
HEATHER D. BOONSTRA ET AL., ABORTION IN WOMEN’S LIVES 25–26 (Guttmacher Inst. ed.,
2006) (“Between 1994 and 2001, the unintended pregnancy rate rose 29% among women
living below the poverty level and 26% among women living between 100% and 200% of
the poverty level, but fell 20% among more affluent women.”).
108 Martha J. Bailey, Brad Hershbein & Amalia R. Miller, The Opt-In Revolution? Contra-
ception and the Gender Gap in Wages 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 17,922, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17922.
109 But see KATE PICKETT & RICHARD WILKINSON, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER
EQUALITY MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER 67–69 (2009) (indicating that studies have shown
that income inequality is not linked to mental illness in men, but is correlated with mental
illness in adult women).
110 See Gould & Paserman, supra note 84, at 259, 263. Gould & Paserman estimate that
differences in male wage inequality can account for up to thirty percent of the decline in
marriage over the past few decades. Their findings hold across a variety of different educa-
tional groups and suggest that both men and women delay marriage in response to greater
male inequality, but not greater female inequality. Id. at 259.
111 Id. at 259.
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A big part of the solution for the problems of male inequality is more and
better jobs. We also need to rebuild a safety net that encourages family stability
without reifying male roles. We have created a society that writes off a high
percentage of men through chronic unemployment and high rates of imprison-
ment for minor offenses. Rebuilding equality begins with reconstructing infra-
structure to support stability. This means innovative entrepreneurship, a more
flexible workplace, and a social safety net that includes health insurance
decoupled from employment, unemployment insurance that allows employment
flexibility without destroying community and family, and education that devel-
ops skills.
Instability in employment has been a major factor undermining family sta-
bility and demoralizing the unemployed.112 The best jobs in years past pro-
vided continuity and the possibility of upward mobility—those who stayed
could expect regular raises and in many cases retraining and promotions.113
Today, the most successful employees demonstrate the ability to acquire addi-
tional education and training on their own, and the most vulnerable have the
least ability to deal with a layoff through the acquisition of new skills. Young
people finishing high school without practical skills or the means to afford
higher education and the long-term unemployed may, accordingly, be among
the most vulnerable.
Moving forward requires a focus on ways to prompt greater employment
throughout the economy and to ease workers’ transitions between jobs. They
include:
Guaranteeing job creation. The economist Hyman Minsky, for example,
saw job creation as a consistent problem of modern technological economies
and proposed that the government become an employer of the last resort.114
Others have proposed counter-cyclical policies, rooted in the non-profit sectors,
including social entrepreneurs. These programs target the least employable and
aim for full-employment economies.115
Entrepreneurship. Free market advocates, aghast at greater government
spending, tend to focus on small businesses.116 Such businesses have led in job
creation in recent years, and they often spur technological advancement that in
turn produces more jobs. Small business development, however, especially in
112 See Farber, supra note 53, at 57. For a discussion of the impact on family stability, see
Hellerstein & Morrill, supra note 63, at 3; see also Charles & Stephens, supra note 64, at
490 (individual layoffs are more likely to increase divorce rates than plant closings or disa-
bility); Sayer et al., supra note 65, at 1985 (noting that employment affects men and
women’s expectations about marriage).
113 See KALLEBERG, supra note 55, at 94. Kalleberg also explains that employment instabil-
ity has increased more for men than women, and more for the less educated and minorities.
Id. at 93.
114 HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY xxv (1986).
115 See, e.g., PAVLINA R. TCHERNEVA, LEVY ECON. INST. OF BARD COLL., FULL EMPLOY-
MENT THROUGH SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE NONPROFIT MODEL FOR IMPLEMENTING A
JOB GUARANTEE 2 (2012).
116 See, e.g., Don Peck, Can the Middle Class Be Saved?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2011), http://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/09/can-the-middle-class-be-saved/8600/3/
(calling for “a combination of more federal investment in scientific research, perhaps bigger
tax breaks for private [research and development] spending,” along with a variety of corpo-
rate tax breaks and incentives).
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the tech sector, often proceeds from publically supported investment in basic
research, effective tech transfer from university labs to private development, a
critical mass of skilled workers, and effective supply networks. Assembling the
parts, accordingly, requires regional development plans and assembling the
right mix of public and private support.
Investing in human capital. Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz argue that
the United States achieved global dominance through investment in education,
producing the most educated population in the world.117 They also conclude
that the United States has lost ground and now lags behind many other coun-
tries.118 Class-based changes in family structure create a vicious cycle, further
reducing the resources that affect the cognitive development of young children
at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder.119 Comprehensive reform would
start with publically subsidized preschools and other forms of early-childhood
education and end with examination of the affordability of higher education.
Consideration of the life paths of young men in their late teens and early twen-
ties should also consider the process of job-related-skill acquisition and train-
ing, and the role of institutions such as the military and universal service. For
example, while the manufacturing sector has lost millions of jobs and has lost
its virtual guarantee as a secure source of jobs, the industry still needs skilled
machinists.120 Yet, the paths from high school graduation into the training nec-
essary to secure such jobs is haphazard. Training efforts that target working-
class men might emphasize greater investment in community colleges, indus-
try-high school partnerships, or apprenticeship programs tied to job placement.
Reknitting the safety net. Even for those who secure full-time employ-
ment, the rate of employment turnover has increased in the economy as a
whole, making the ability to acquire new skills, seek new employment, and
manage the period in-between jobs more critical for every social class. Henry
Farber, for example, finds that “[b]y virtually any measure[,] more recent
cohorts of male workers have been with their current employer for less time at
specific ages.”121 Greater emphasis on small business and entrepreneurship is
likely to increase employment instability and make the transitions more critical
for family stability. Greater unemployment assistance, perhaps in the form of
opportunities for retraining or returns to school, would assist both individual
and family developments—so would more flexible programs that make it easier
for both men and women to combine work, study, and parenting.
All of this requires thinking about how the pieces fit together to guarantee
at least a minimum level of economic security. Yale political scientist Jacob
Hacker argues that Americans face “much greater economic risk” from less-
secure pensions, health care, and public programs designed for protection, yet,
paradoxically, security (or defenses against risk) is critical in providing the
117 See GOLDIN & KATZ, supra note 31, at 130.
118 Id. at 325–28.
119 Robert H. Bradley & Robert F. Corwyn, Socioeconomic Status and Child Development,
53 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 371, 375 (2002); see also SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR,
GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS 2–3 (1994).
120 See, e.g., Whoriskey, supra note 37.
121 Farber, supra note 53, at 57.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\13-2\NVJ205.txt unknown Seq: 24 16-MAY-13 13:45
Winter 2013] IS MARRIAGE FOR RICH MEN? 409
basis for economic opportunity.122 This solution may rest on the system of
“flexicurity”123 that is being developed in Europe. Flexicurity seeks to combine
employer flexibility with worker security. Doing so requires rethinking the
relationship between public and private. The essential elements of such a model
require universal, affordable, portable health insurance, which ideally should be
separated from employment. It also requires a more secure and portable pen-
sion system, more generous unemployment insurance and greater opportunities
(as we have emphasized above) to acquire new skills, and education over the
course of a lifetime. If employment is more transient and employers invest little
in their workers, then a revitalized social safety net needs to fill in the gaps.124
CONCLUSION
The creation of greater inequality, the shredding of the social safety net,
and the increasing cost of higher education are integrally related to the chang-
ing structure of the family. Marriage rates by themselves have a variety of
meanings, but class-based increases in family instability have one overriding
consequence: the creation of a less-just society with diminished prospects for a
large percentage of our children. What we really need to do is increase our
investments in children, employment stability for men and women, and healthy
communities, and stop pretending that family structure is simply a matter of
morals or will.
122 JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE NEW ECONOMIC INSECURITY AND THE
DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 165–66 (2008).
123 See, e.g., PAUL VANDENBERG, IS ASIA ADOPTING FLEXICURITY? A SURVEY OF EMPLOY-
MENT POLICIES IN SIX COUNTRIES iii (Int’l Labour Office ed., 2008), available at http://
www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/download/elm/elm08-4.pdf (flexicurity “describes
the nexus between the capacity to adapt the workforce to changes in the economy and the
capacity to maintain working and living conditions of the workforce”); see also JOSHUA
COHEN & CHARLES SABEL, FLEXICURITY 11–12 (2009), available at http://www.stanford.
edu/group/scspi/_media/pdf/pathways/spring_2009/CohenSabel.pdf.
124 HACKER, supra note 122, at 182 (advocating more portable benefits).
